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Abstract
Recently, Dollimore criticized our claim that Organizational Ecology is not 
a Darwinian research program. She argued that Organizational Ecology is 
merely an incomplete Darwinian program and provided a suggestion as to 
how this incompleteness could be remedied. Here, we argue that Dollimore’s 
suggestion fails to remedy the principal problem that Organizational Ecology 
faces and that there are good reasons to think of the program as deeply 
incompatible with Darwinian thinking.
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1. Introduction
In earlier work (Reydon and Scholz 2009; Scholz and Reydon 2010), we 
argued that Organizational Ecology, a self-professed Darwinian research 
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1Dawkins’s distinction is between replicators and vehicles, Hull’s is between replica-
tors and interactors.
2Note that we do not hold that there is no possible solid theoretical foundation for the 
program—only that it is highly unlikely that there is a Darwinian foundation in any 
meaningful sense of “Darwinian.”
program in the domain of organizational science, does not have what it takes 
to actually be a Darwinian program. In a recent article, Dollimore (2014) 
criticizes our argumentation for failing to establish that Organizational 
Ecology indeed is not Darwinian in nature. According to Dollimore, what we 
have shown merely is that as a Darwinian research program Organizational 
Ecology is incomplete, not that it is inherently non-Darwinian or that it is 
fundamentally incompatible to Darwinian accounts of evolution. If more ele-
ments would be added and more details fleshed out, Dollimore suggests, in 
the end we will obtain a fully fledged Darwinian research program for orga-
nizational science. In addition, Dollimore advances a suggestion as to what 
would need to be added: she suggests a reformulation of Organizational 
Ecology using the concepts of “replicator” and “interactor” that were intro-
duced by biologist Richard Dawkins (1976, 1982) and philosopher of biology 
David Hull (1980).1
We are indebted to Dollimore for her critique of our analysis of the nature 
of Organizational Ecology and for her support of several core elements of our 
critique. Dollimore and we agree, we believe, that Organizational Ecology in 
its present form stands on quite shaky theoretical foundations and thus faces 
a severe problem. But we present different analyses of what, exactly, is the 
problem and hence entertain diverging views regarding what could and 
should be done about it. We think it unlikely that Organizational Ecology will 
be able to construct a sufficiently solid Darwinian foundation and accord-
ingly suggest that its proponents should reconsider what kind of research 
program Organizational Ecology could be, if not a Darwinian one.2 Dollimore, 
in contrast, is more optimistic and sees ways to strengthen the Darwinian 
foundations of the program.
This difference of opinions presents us with a twofold challenge. First 
(Section 2), we are challenged to show more clearly and/or convincingly that 
Organizational Ecology is indeed incompatible to Darwinism, rather than 
merely being incomplete Darwinism. In addition (Section 3), we are chal-
lenged to examine Dollimore’s proposal that the concepts of “replicator” and 
“interactor” will enable Organizational Ecologists to come up with a formu-
lation of their program that (1) can be counted as a proper Darwinian program 
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and (2) avoids the specific problems we highlighted in our previous publica-
tions on Organizational Ecology. Section 4 concludes.
2. Destructive Incompatibility or Remediable 
Incompleteness?
Our argument to the extent that Organizational Ecology is not a Darwinian 
research program focused on the notion of “population” in Organizational 
Ecology. We attempted to show that the way Organizational Ecologists 
conceive of populations of organizations does not fit the way populations 
are conceived of in evolutionary contexts and that, therefore, Organizational 
Ecologists cannot say to have identified entities that actually evolve, at 
least not in any way that even faintly resembles biological evolutionary 
processes.
The problem is the following. While Organizational Ecologists define 
organizational populations as sets of organizations that share a common orga-
nizational form, in evolutionary biology populations are conceived of as 
reproductive communities, that is, systems of reproductively interconnected 
organisms rather than sets of organisms that share a number of relevant traits. 
This is important, because their being systems of reproductively intercon-
nected organisms is what makes biological populations into the sort of things 
that can partake in evolutionary processes in the Darwinian sense. If a popu-
lation is to be able to evolve in an open-ended manner, as biological popula-
tions are, it should not be defined by means of one or several traits the 
possession of which constitutes a necessary and sufficient requirement for 
being a member of the population.
On the Organizational Ecologist’s definition of organizational popula-
tions, in order to be counted as a member of a particular organizational popu-
lation, an organization must exhibit the particular organizational form— 
whatever this may be and however it is conceived of—that defines the popu-
lation. In addition, when a population is defined as a set of organizations with 
a particular form, any organization that exhibits this form—wherever it oper-
ates and with whomever it interacts—should be counted as a member of the 
population. Of course, researchers may choose to study only a subset of a set 
of organizations by considering only those members of the set operating in a 
particular location. In such a case, an additional characteristic is added to the 
set’s definition: the set under consideration consists of organizations that 
share a particular organizational form and a particular operational environ-
ment or location. In any case, this essential trait or traits cannot become lost 
on pain of ceasing to be a member of the set: any organization that lacks one 
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3For reasons of simplicity, we use “set” to refer to intensionally defined groupings 
of things and ignore more subtle distinctions between sets, classes, kinds, and so on.
or more of the essential traits defining a set automatically is not a member of 
the set.3 This means that novelties can only occur in a very limited sense 
within an organizational population. Novelties that affect the defining essen-
tial traits, in particular novelties that change the defining organizational form, 
entail that the organization bearing the new trait ceases to be a member of its 
original population. By consequence, variation within populations—one of 
the driving factors in evolution—is severely limited: the members of an orga-
nizational population can only vary up to that extent which is determined by 
the population’s definition.
Moreover, sets do not exhibit the internal connectedness that makes bio-
logical populations into units of evolution. As remarked above, biological 
populations are reproductive communities, that is, groups of organisms that 
are connected by ancestor-descendant and mating relations. Because of these 
relations, organisms in later generations in a population resemble successful 
organisms in earlier generations. In addition, biological populations are com-
paratively well buffered against the influx from genes from outside the popu-
lation, giving evolutionary novelties a chance to establish themselves in the 
population before the trait pool becomes diluted with new traits flowing into 
the population from the outside. As sets, organizational populations are not 
the sort of things that exhibit this kind of internal connectedness and buffer-
ing. Thus, the organizational “populations” studied in Organizational Ecology 
are insufficiently like the organismal populations studied in evolutionary 
biology to act as entities in evolutionary processes.
To summarize, from a metaphysical perspective, the populations featuring 
in biological evolutionary processes are individuals, not sets of similar organ-
isms. By conceiving of organizational populations as sets of similar organiza-
tions, Organizational Ecologists adopt a population concept that is at odds 
with evolutionary theory. If this is right, Organizational Ecology is incompat-
ible to Darwinian accounts of evolution. The problem is not that something is 
missing from Organizational Ecology, but that a core element of the ontology 
of the account of organizational “evolution” on which the research program 
is built is categorically different from the corresponding element of the ontol-
ogy of biological evolution. As long as Organizational Ecologists retain their 
view of organizational populations as sets rather than systems of interacting 
organizations, the research program will continue to be incompatible with 
Darwinism.
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4Hull’s (1980) replicator–interactor distinction serves the same purpose and Dawkins 
(1982, 46) pointed out that the terms “vehicle” and “interactor” have largely the same 
meaning.
3. Replicators and Interactors to the Rescue?
Let us now turn to Dollimore’s positive suggestion that a reformulation of 
Organizational Ecology using the notions of “replicator” and “interactor” 
might turn it into a full-fledged Darwinian research program. Note that 
Dollimore’s paper fails to go substantially beyond merely putting this sug-
gestion on the table. Dollimore (2014, 24) tells us that “the conceptual appa-
ratus, in the form of the replicator-interactor distinction, now exists to enable 
organizational ecologists to develop a more complete Darwinian program.” 
But she leaves most of the details to be filled in by others (as she implicitly 
acknowledges: Dollimore, 2014). She suggests that replicators may be identi-
fied on the level of organizational routines and interactors on the level of 
individual organizations (Dollimore, 2014; see also Hodgson and Knudsen 
2004) but does not provide sufficient details to show that this move actually 
leads to the desired result. Filling in some of the details shows, we think, that 
Dollimore’s suggestion does not solve Organizational Ecology’s problems.
In the first place, it should be noted that the replicator–interactor frame-
work by itself does not constitute a Darwinian ontology. Granting that one 
should be able to identify replicators and interactors (or vehicles) in a given 
domain for evolution to be possible in that domain, this is merely a necessary 
but not a sufficient requirement. Having identified replicators and interactors 
by itself does not give you Darwinian evolution. What needs to be shown in 
addition is that the domain encompasses replicators and interactors of the 
right sort. Darwinian evolution rests on the existence of nearly faithful repro-
duction that makes offspring organisms highly similar (but not identical) to 
their ancestors. It is such reproductive connections that build the entities that 
evolve (populations) and it thus needs to be shown that the interactors or 
vehicles identified in a given domain are related to one another in the right 
way.
Dawkins developed his replicator–vehicle distinction as a conceptual 
framework within which natural selection could be characterized and the 
units of selection could be identified (Dawkins 1982).4 Replicators (genes for 
Dawkins) are the entities that survive in selection processes, while vehicles 
(organisms and possibly higher level entities too) are the entities that are 
selected. According to Dawkins’s (1976, 16) original definition, a replicator 
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is “a particularly remarkable molecule [that] had the extraordinary property 
of being able to create copies of itself.” Alternatively, “[a] replicator may be 
defined as any entity in the universe of which copies are made” (Dawkins 
1982, 46). Vehicles, Dawkins (1982, 46) writes, are entities “in which repli-
cators travel about. Vehicle selection is the process by which some vehicles 
are more successful than others in ensuring the survival of their replicators.” 
Identifying routines and the like as the replicators of Organizational Ecology 
and organizations as its vehicles or interactors seems to fit these definitions 
well.
While we agree that routines might be seen as replicators, we believe that 
it is not with the replicators that the problem lies—it is with the interactors or 
vehicles. Dawkins identifies organisms as the principal (and possibly only) 
vehicles of biological evolution, but acknowledges that vehicles might also 
be identified at other levels: cells and groups of organisms, for example. In 
the biological case, “Each new vehicle comes into being through an act of 
reproduction. New parts of vehicles come into being through growth” 
(Dawkins 1982, 54, emphasis added). Or as Dawkins writes a few lines later: 
“[o]ne act of reproduction, one vehicle” (1982, 54 and “[t]o qualify as a 
‘vehicle,’ an entity must come into being by reproduction” (1982, 56).
Why this emphasis on reproduction? To achieve more clarity about this, 
we can consult Hull’s definition of “interactor” and his account of natural 
selection based on the notions of “replicator” and “interactor.” According to 
Hull (1980, 318), an interactor is “an entity that directly interacts as a cohe-
sive whole with its environment in such a way that replication is differential.” 
He goes on to define the selection process as “a process in which the differ-
ential extinction and proliferation of interactors cause the differential per-
petuation of the replicators that produced them” (Hull 1980, 318; cf. 
Dollimore, 2014, 16). The causal connection between the extinction and pro-
liferation of interactors and the differential replication of replicators is what 
brings reproduction into play.
In biological evolution, the differential success of interactors causes dif-
ferential replication via the reproduction of interactors. Darwin saw that 
organisms tend to produce more offspring than can survive and concluded 
from this observation that organisms engage in a struggle for existence with 
each other and with their environments. By consequence, in the Dawkins/Hull 
terminology, vehicles (organisms) carrying replicators that benefit them in 
their struggle for existence will be able to produce more vehicles carrying 
these same replicators than do vehicles carrying less beneficial replicators. 
Biological populations are the systems within which replicators can multiply 
and minute beneficial variations at the replicator level can accumulate to cause 
novel traits. The existence of reproductive relations between interactors and of 
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populations of interactors as comparatively stable and buffered reproductive 
systems thus is crucial for the occurrence of Darwinian evolution. The prob-
lem for Organizational Ecology, then, is not so much that the mechanism of 
inheritance (or rather, transmission) of routines between organizations is 
unclear, as Dollimore (2014) suggests. Explaining how routines are transmit-
ted between organizations will not solve the problem. Rather, the problem is 
that successful organizations (interactors) do not give rise to offspring organi-
zations that closely resemble their “parents”—that is, that organizations do not 
“breed true” and, indeed, do not breed at all. There is no reason to think that 
routines are transmitted preferably to organizations of the same kind or set.
Organizational Ecology does not merely need replicators and interactors, 
but replicators and interactors of the particular sort that can constitute com-
paratively well integrated and buffered reproductive communities. Dollimore 
(2014, 15) suggests with respect to the interactor that “[i]n biology, this is the 
organism, and in the business world, this is the organization or the firm.” We 
disagree: organizations or firms are interactors in the weak sense of entities 
interacting with their environments, but they are not interactors of the right 
sort, that is, interactors capable of forming evolving populations, because 
they do not reproduce their kind.
4. Conclusion
Dollimore (2014, 3) writes that we have overlooked the replicator–interactor 
distinction in our critique of Organizational Ecology and that we hold a 
“rather narrow formulation of Darwinism.” We hope that the preceding con-
siderations have made clear why we intentionally have not considered—but not 
overlooked!—the replicator–interactor distinction in our work on 
Organizational Ecology. While the distinction is an important conceptual tool 
for identifying the units of selection and describing a part of the ontology of 
Darwinism, we do not think the distinction will be able to serve as a cure for 
Organizational Ecology’s problems. Identifying the replicators and interac-
tors in the organizational domain is a first step toward an improved 
Organizational Ecology—here we agree with Dollimore—but doing so will 
not solve the main problem the research program faces, we contend. 
Organizational Ecologists will have to abandon their definition of organiza-
tional populations as sets of organizations that all share a common form and 
come up with an alternative definition to remedy the program’s current 
incompatibility with Darwinian thinking. While we do not hold that it is in 
principle impossible to remedy this incompatibility, so far no account of 
organizational populations is available that actually does remedy it. 
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Dollimore’s paper does not propose a cure either: Dollimore flatly claims that 
evolving populations can be found in the organizational domain, but stops 
short of actually showing us where they are or how we might identify them. 
Here, then, lies our principal challenge to proponents of Organizational 
Ecology.
While we agree with Dollimore that ours is a narrower view of Darwinism 
than hers, we do not think that ours is too narrow a view. We hold a compara-
tively conservative view of Darwinism, because of a—we think, healthy—
skepticism toward what philosophers of biology David Hull (1998, 513) and 
Werner Callebaut (2011, 103) called “evolutionary everything.” They referred 
to an exceedingly great enthusiasm for seeing Darwinian evolutionary pro-
cesses in domains outside biology. “Evolutionary everything is hot right 
now,” Hull (1998, 513) observed, and apparently this observation still holds. 
According to Callebaut (2011, 103),
[a] recurrent problem with many of these transfers of evolutionary thinking to 
domains that did not originally identify themselves as dealing with issues biological 
. . . is that they often rely on a one-sided and rather shallow picture of the 
evolutionary process—typically, the “selfish gene” view popularized by Dawkins.
We wholeheartedly agree. And it seems that our caution even is shared by 
Dawkins (2008, 4-5) himself:
Although Darwin’s theory can be applied to much beyond the evolution of organic 
life, I want to counsel against a different sense of Universal Darwinism. This is the 
uncritical dragging of some garbled version of natural selection into every 
available field of human discourse, whether it is appropriate or not.
Maybe the “fittest” firms survive in the marketplace of commerce, or the fittest 
theories survive in the scientific marketplace, but we should at the very least be 
cautious before we get carried away.
From our perspective, Dollimore’s view of Darwinism is much too lib-
eral, as from her perspective, our view appears too narrow. Dollimore wants 
to bring phenomena under the umbrella of Darwinian evolution that we 
think fall outside its scope—or more precisely: of which we think it has not 
yet been shown that they do fall within its scope. In such cases, the burden 
of proof, we contend, lies with those who entertain comparatively liberal 
views of Darwinian evolution. Thus, Organizational Ecologists will have to 
show that there really are Darwinian evolutionary processes out there in the 
organizational domain that can be accounted for by means of the same the-
ory that does so much work in the biological domain—rather than 
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processes that merely look like biological evolution in some respects but are 
quite different in other respects.
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